

magnitude; but our atoms are not either the points or the solids of geometry, but compact bodies, which, if they were large enough, you could see and touch. . . .” . . . The atom thus ceased to be confused with the unit of number and the point of geometry, and became a purely physical body whose essential property was impenetrability.’ The answer of Leucippus and Democritus was not, however, the only possible answer to Zeno: it could equally easily have been granted that physical matter, like geometrical magnitude, was infinitely divisible. This, as is evident from 499, is the answer that Anaxagoras chose to give. ‘I grant’, he means, ‘that physical matter, like geometrical magnitude, is infinitely divisible; but physical matter composes sensible bodies, and since sensible bodies exist and have magnitude, the same must be true of physical matter. However far you subdivide matter [Zeller’s reading τομῆ for τὸ μὴ is attractive], you can never reduce it to sheer nothingness; even the smallest imaginable particle must still possess some magnitude. In consequence each thing is indeed both great and small: great because it contains an infinite number of parts, and small because those parts are themselves of an infinitesimal smallness.’ Anaxagoras’ theory of matter is in fact deliberately adopted, like that of the atomists, as an answer to Zeno; and when that answer is added to his answer to Parmenides, one half of the basis of his system is now complete. He is enabled, by his belief in the infinite divisibility of matter, to devise a cosmogony and to give an account of change which does indeed eliminate the forbidden coming-into-being of what was not.

MIND

503 Fr. 12, Simplicius *Phys.* 164, 24 and 156, 13 τὰ μὲν ἅλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεφρῶ ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν ἄν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεφρῶ· ἐν παντί γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἄν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ

503 *All other things have a portion of everything, but Mind is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing but is all alone by itself. For if it was not by itself, but was mixed with anything else, it would have a share of all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as I said earlier; and the things that were mingled with it would hinder it so that it could control nothing in the same way as it does*

μόνον ἔοντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ πλεόν περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλεόν. καὶ τὰ συμμιεσγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην ἦν νῦν περιχωρεῖ τὰ τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου πλήν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὁμοίος ἔστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὁμοίου οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτων πλείεστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἕκαστόν ἔστι καὶ ἦν.

504 Fr. 13, *Simplicius Phys.* 300, 31 καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.

505 Fr. 9, *ibid.* 35, 14 . . . οὕτω τούτων περιχωρούντων τε καὶ

now being alone by itself. For it is the finest of all things and the purest, it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest power; and mind controls all things, both the greater and the smaller, that have life. Mind controlled also the whole rotation, so that it began to rotate in the beginning. And it began to rotate first from a small area, but it now rotates over a wider and will rotate over a wider area still. And the things that are mingled and separated and divided off, all are known by Mind. And all things that were to be, all things that were but are not now, all things that are now or that shall be, Mind arranged them all, including this rotation in which are now rotating the stars, the sun and moon, the air and the aither that are being separated off. And this rotation caused the separating off. And the dense is separated off from the rare, the hot from the cold, the bright from the dark and the dry from the moist. But there are many portions of many things, and nothing is altogether separated off nor divided one from the other except Mind. Mind is all alike, both the greater and the smaller quantities of it, while nothing else is like anything else, but each single body is and was most plainly those things of which it contains most.

504 *And when Mind initiated motion, from all that was moved separation began, and as much as Mind moved was all divided off; and as things moved and were divided off, the rotation greatly increased the process of dividing.*

505 *. . . as these things rotated thus and were separated off by the force and speed (of*

ἀποκρινομένων ὑπὸ βίης τε καὶ ταχυτήτος. βίην δὲ ἡ ταχυτῆς ποιεῖ. ἡ δὲ ταχυτῆς αὐτῶν οὐδενὶ ἔοικε χρήματι τὴν ταχυτῆτα τῶν νῦν ἔόντων χρημάτων ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ πάντως πολλαπλασίως ταχύ ἐστι.

506 Fr. 14, *ibid.* 157, 7 ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς αἶε ἐστι, τὸ κάρτα [so Diels: ὅσα ἐστὶ τε κάρτα Simplic. mss.] καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῷ πολλῷ περιέχοντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς προσκριθείσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις.

Another Parmenidean demand with which Anaxagoras had to comply was that motion should not be simply taken for granted but explained. In place of Empedocles' Love and Strife (moral and psychological forces expressed in corporeal terms, see **424**) Anaxagoras substitutes the single intellectual motive force of Mind. It too, like Love and Strife, has many of the qualities of an abstract principle. 'It has all knowledge about everything, and the greatest strength; it controls all things that have life'; and 'it set in order all things that were to be', including, of course, the cosmic revolution. Yet at the same time it is 'the finest of all things and the purest'; it is 'all alike, both the larger and the smaller quantities'; and though it is 'mixed with nothing', it is none the less present 'there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united and separated off'. Anaxagoras in fact is striving, as had several of his predecessors, to imagine and describe a truly incorporeal entity. But as with them, so still with him, the only ultimate criterion of reality is extension in space. Mind, like everything else, is corporeal, and owes its power partly to its fineness, partly to the fact that it alone, though present in the mixture, yet remains unmixed.

How Mind imparted the first rotatory movement is by no means obvious; it may be that even Anaxagoras himself had no clear mental picture of the process. It appears, however, that the area affected was at first small but is still steadily increasing. The speed of the revolution is immense, and therefore its effect on the original mixture is very powerful (**505**). The immediate consequence is progressive separation: the moment the rotation takes in a new

their rotation). And the speed creates the force. Their speed is like the speed of nothing that now exists among men, but it is altogether many times as fast.

506 *But Mind, which ever is, is assuredly even now where everything else is too, in the surrounding mass and in the things that have been either aggregated or separated.*

area, as it is doing all the time, the ingredients of that area begin at once to separate off (504). It is in fact the rotation which is directly responsible for the separation, which leads in turn to cosmogony. Mind, having initiated the rotation, remains alone ultimately responsible; but at the same time, as is evident from the statement at the end of 504, once the original motion has been imparted, purely mechanical factors begin to operate and the agency of Mind itself becomes less direct. This is a feature of Anaxagoras' system which, to the irritation of Plato and Aristotle (see 522 and note), becomes more pronounced as his cosmogony proceeds.

With the introduction of Mind the basis of the system is complete. Anaxagoras is, like Empedocles, in a sense a dualist; and his dualism is, for the first time, in a sense a dualism of Mind and matter.¹ But both members of this dualism are peculiar. Mind, like matter, is corporeal and owes its power over matter to its fineness and purity. Matter itself, so far from being pure, is originally at least an infinitely divisible mixture of every form of substance that the world is ultimately to contain.

¹ Cf. 507 Theophrastus *Phys. Op.* fr. 4 *ap.* Simplicium *Phys.* 27, 17 (DK 59A41) καὶ οὕτω μὲν λαμβανόντων δόξειεν ἂν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους ποιεῖν, τὴν δὲ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν μίαν τὸν νοῦν· εἰ δὲ τις τὴν μίξιν τῶν ἀπάντων ὑπολάβοι μίαν εἶναι φύσιν ἀόριστον καὶ κατ' εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος, συμβαίνει δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν τε τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν.

IN EVERYTHING A PORTION OF EVERYTHING

508 Fr. 6, Simplicius *Phys.* 164, 26 καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραι εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τούλαχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ'

507 *Such being their theory, Anaxagoras would appear to make his material principles infinite, but the cause of motion and coming into being one only, namely Mind. But if we were to suppose that the mixture of all things was a single substance, indefinite both in form and in extent, then it follows that he is really affirming two first principles only, namely the substance of the infinite and Mind.*

508 *And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in number, so too all things would be in everything. Nor is it possible that they should exist apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is not possible that there should be a smallest part, nothing can be put apart nor come to be all by itself, but as things were originally, so they*

30 [F14] Simplicius *Physics* 164.23–24 [B11]ἐν παντί παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι¹ πλήν νοῦ, ἔστιν² οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἐνι.31 [F15] *Ibid.* 164.24–25, 156.13–157.4; 176.34–177.6 (B12)

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει,³ νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεωὶ ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλωι, μετεῖχεν ἂν⁴ ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεωι· ἐν παντί γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν⁵ αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἰσχύει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω,⁶ πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ μικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν,⁷ ἐπειτέ⁸ πλεῖον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμिशγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι – καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι, καὶ ὅποια ἔσται⁹ – πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρεῖ τὰ τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὐτῆ¹⁰ ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου πλήν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὁμοίος ἔστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάσσων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι ὁμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτωι¹¹ πλεῖστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἔστι καὶ ἦν.

¹ μοῖρά ἐστι EΔW. ² om. Δ.³ DEΔW: ἔχει aF. ⁴ μετεῖχεν ἂν a: μετεῖχε μὲν codd.⁵ Dβ: ἀνεκώλυεν EFW. ⁶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω 177.2: μείζω καὶ ἐλάσσω 156.21.⁷ DEβW: περιχωρῆσαι aF. ⁸ Ritter: ἐπεὶ δὲ codd.⁹ ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι om. 156.26, habet 177.5: καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι 156.26, om. 177.5: ὀπόσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ἔσται 165.33: ὅσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται 174.8–9.¹⁰ αὐτῆ Simp. 179.1 (DF): αὐτὸ 176.1 (F). ¹¹ DEβW: ἄλλω τῶ F: ἀλλ' ὅτεωv Preller.

B. Mind and motion

30 [F14] In everything there is a portion of everything except mind. And in some things mind too is present.

31 [F15] Everything else has a portion of everything, but mind is boundless, autonomous, and mixed with no object, but it is alone all by itself. If it were not by itself, but had been mixed with something else, it would have a portion of all objects, if it had been mixed with any; for there is a portion of everything in everything, as I said earlier [F12]. And the things mixed with it would hinder it from ruling any object in the way it does when it is alone by itself. For it is the finest of all objects and the purest, and it exercises complete oversight over everything and prevails above all. And all things that have soul, both the larger and the smaller, these does mind rule. And of the whole revolution did mind take control, so that it revolved in the beginning. And first it began from a small revolution, now it is revolving more, and it will revolve still more. And things mixed together, things separated, and things segregated, all these did mind comprehend. And the kinds of things that were to be – such as were but now are not, all that now are, and such as will be – all these did mind set in order, as well as this revolution, with which the stars, the sun, the moon, the air, and the aether which were being separated now revolve. For this revolution made things separate. And from the rare is separated the dense, from the cold the hot, from the dark the bright, and from the wet the dry. But there are many portions of many things. And nothing is completely separated nor segregated the one from the other except mind. Mind is all alike, both the larger and the smaller. No other thing is like anything else, but each one is and was most manifestly those things of which it has the most.