

Ústav filosofie a religionistiky FF UK

vás srdečně zve na přednášku na téma

Necessitarian Russellian Monism

kterou prosloví

Dr Sam Coleman

(University of Hertfordshire)

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Abstrakt:

Russellian Monists hold that underlying the basic dispositional properties of physics, like mass and charge, are phenomenal (or protophenomenal) properties. This metaphysical relationship is meant to explain the physical production of consciousness when the microphysical is arranged as a brain, and to enmesh consciousness in the physical causal order at the same time. It has recently been argued by Howell that the Russellian monist picture cannot in fact account for the causal power of consciousness, because a modified version of Kim's exclusion argument applies to the (proto)phenomenal properties with respect to their physical dispositional profiles. Howell's argument depends on thought experiments where (proto)phenomenal properties and physical dispositional roles can vary independently, e.g. red plays the mass role in one world, but green plays it in another world. In this paper I outline possible responses on behalf of the Russellian monist, notably including the stance of 'necessitarian Russellian monism', which posits a metaphysically necessary relationship between a (proto)phenomenal property and its physical causal role.